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LEVERAGE  OF LISTED  FIRMS  IN  
CHINA 
 
Abstract 
In this paper the relationship between leverage, performance and a firm’s ownership 
structure is investigated. It is an exploratory study based on listed firms in China, that is all firms 
listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 1999 to 2005. The results of an 
empirical analysis of ownership structures and the leverage are reported in this paper.  
The most significant result is that foreign holdings are found to have a significant 
relationship with the leverage of listed firms in China. Whereas, somewhat unexpectedly, 
institutional ownership, through Legal Person holding companies, state ownership and private 
holdings are not found to have a significant relationship with the capital structure choices of firms 
in China. The results also suggest that some firm-specific factors that are relevant for explaining 
firm leverage generally referred to in studies in developed economies, such as profitability, 
growth opportunities, size and tax shields, are also relevant in China. The age of the firms and the 
industry to which they principally belong also has significant bearing. Yet direct government 
grants and the use of an internationally renowned auditing firm do not show a significant 
relationship. 
Keywords: State-owned enterprises, Ownership structures, Capital Structure, Emerging 
markets, China. 
JEL classifications: P31, L33, G32, G38, O53. 
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1. Introduction 
The relationship between leverage, performance and a firm’s ownership structure is 
investigated in this paper. It is an exploratory empirical analysis of all firms listed on the 
Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 1999 to 2005.  
China has experienced outstanding growth as the reforms which began in the late 1970s 
gain momentum. As China moves towards a “socialist market economy” the reforms have been 
an important aspect of the outstanding economic growth that has been accomplished. In the 
corporate world the majority of small and medium and many large former SOEs have been 
privatised or partially privatised. The focus of this paper is on the interesting ownership mix of 
the listed firms. The greatest proportion of these have ownership of state at an average of about 
40%, Legal Person at around 20%, private at 30% and foreign holdings at 3%1. There are also a 
limited number of management and employee holdings in some firms. Firms may also have 
institutional investors, both domestic and foreign. Adding to the complexity, some holdings are 
nontradable, such as state and Legal Person holdings, and the rest are tradable. However, some 
shares (B-Shares) are only tradable to foreign investors or domestic investors with foreign 
currency assets. These diverse holdings make for a study of how these ownership structures 
influence the performance and capital structure, in this case specifically the leverage, of listed 
firms in China. 
The consequence of the capital structure, ownership structure and profitability of China’s 
many and often immense state-owned enterprises (SOEs) will be considerable, especially as the 
country’s market economy gains momentum. SOEs play a central role in that they supply crucial 
raw materials, and are “pillars” in important large, capital-intensive industries, such as power, 
                                                 
1
 See Figure 1. These are discussed in greater detail later in the paper. 
 4 
steel, machinery and chemicals. Therefore, the success of SOE reform is a significant factor in 
China’s future economic prosperity and ability to contend with mounting social justice issues.  
The capital structure literature has focussed on the theoretical models explaining capital 
structure and empirically testing these models. Over the years, this has fundamentally focussed 
on large corporations which have publicly traded equity and debt in developed economies {for 
example see \Rajan, 1995 #588; Wald, 1999 #325; Wald, 1999 #326; Bevan, 2004 #115; Kale, 
1991 #560; Kisgen, 2006 #9; Hovakimian, 2006 #20; Flannery, 2006 #21; Brounen, 2006 #13; 
Berger, 2006 #15; Ross, 2005 #58; Miao, 2005 #35; Desai, 2004 #80; Allayannis, 2003 #137; 
Baker, 2002 #221}. More recently studies have been undertaken in developing and transitional 
economies. For example, in a study of developing countries {Booth, 2001 #258}, of Central and 
Eastern European economies {de Haas, 2006 #25}, a study of the effect of political patronage in 
Malaysia {Fraser, 2006 #16}, a study of capital structure in Pakistan {Hijazi, 2006 #27}, and the 
influence of the chaebol in South Korea {Kim, 2006 #6}. There have also been a few studies 
focusing on various issues of the capital structure of listed firms in China {Huang, 2006 #1; Tong, 
2005 #2; Zhang, 2002 #4}. Thus, there is just a narrow range of literature and research aimed at 
furthering our understanding of capital structures in developing and transitional economies that 
often have unique institutional structures. 
Thus, the relation between leverage, performance and a firm’s ownership structure are 
investigated in this paper. Other factors investigated are growth opportunities, size and age of the 
firm, dividend/bonus payment, tax shields, tangibility, and the industry to which they principally 
belong. Other aspects not previously included in studies of China are direct government grants 
indicating direct state support, the use of internationally renowned “Big Six” auditing firms and a 
corporate governance variable if the Chair and President are the same person.  
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The study is based on all firms listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 
1999 to 2005. Thus, the study is based on more recent data than earlier studies in China. This is 
an important distinction in the context of China as the environment is changing significantly over 
time - the market is maturing, the free market economy is evolving and political involvement in 
listed firms is diminishing over time.  
The results are that leverage has a significant negative relationship profitability. It also 
suggests that some firm-specific factors that are relevant for explaining firm leverage generally 
referred to in studies in developed economies, such as , growth opportunities, size and tax shields, 
are also relevant in China. A very important result is that foreign holdings are found to have a 
significant relationship with the leverage of listed firms in China. Whereas, somewhat 
unexpectedly, institutional ownership, through Legal Person holding companies, state ownership 
and private holdings are not found to have a significant relationship with the capital structure 
choices of firms in China. The age of the firms and the industry to which they principally belong 
also has significant bearing. Yet direct government grants and the use of an internationally 
renowned auditing firm do not show a significant relationship. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 is a short discussion of SOE 
ownership in China. Section 3 discusses the data. Sections 4 and 5 discuss the performance and 
ownership structure study and the descriptive statistics. Sections 6 present the empirical results 
on SOE performance changes and the relationship between ownership mix and firm performance 
and Section 7 concludes the paper. 
2. SOE Ownership in China 
A commitment was made in 1997 to an immense privatization program of the estimated 
308,000 {Morrison, 1999 #1111} SOEs. The slogan of the program was zhuada fangxiao, 
 6 
meaning “protect the large, release the small” {Hong Kong Economic Journal, September 19, 
1997, \ #396; Ho, 2003 #5893}. This policy is directed at both concentrating reform energy on 
1,000 or so of the largest enterprises, many of which are “pillar industries,” and toward escalating 
the privatization of numerous small and selected medium SOEs. Through this scheme, vast 
numbers of small and medium sized SOEs are being merged, sold or allowed to embark on joint 
venture partnerships. It has resulted in a privatization program of unparalleled proportions. 
However, the extent of reforms varies considerably. Whilst many smaller SOEs have been 
privatized, typically large SOEs remain firmly within the control of the state. The bulk of China’s 
SOEs are now structured as corporations and more than 1,000 enterprises have raised additional 
capital by issuing new shares to outside shareholders by listing on the Shanghai and Shenzhen 
stock exchanges. Thus, ownership structures are a key consideration of enterprise reforms in 
China. 
In China, a typical listed firm has a combination of major owners. Ownership structure is 
typically made up of three primary groups of shareholders – the state, Legal Persons, and 
domestic individual investors. Foreign holdings also feature as do employee and offshore shares 
that are offered by a small number of firms but typically represent only low levels of ownership. 
In brief, state shares are generally classified as those held by one of the various levels of 
government, state agents or by SOEs. These are held by the state and state-owned holding 
companies on behalf of the state. There are three forms of state ownership – “Direct”, “state 
shares” and “Legal Persons.” Generically the first two are simply classified as “state shares” and 
the last as “Legal Person” shares.  
In the majority of instances state ownership is classified as “state shares” in the data and 
literature and refers to state ownership which is typically held through state entities other than 
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Legal Persons. These entities are often SOEs or bodies controlled by various levels of 
government. The third category mentioned above is Legal Person ownership. Legal Person 
ownership is state equity held by state domestic institutions or holding firms. These are 
principally autonomously managed investment institutions that are primarily state-owned 
government agencies {Gul, 2001 #8245; Xu, 1997 #8321}. Therefore, the ownership structure is 
a form of pyramid holdings, in this case, primarily by the state {Watanabe, 2002 #3096}. None of 
these holdings can be publicly traded. They are thus often classified as “non-tradeable A-shares.” 
However, they have the same dividend rights and voting rights as other shares. These various 
classifications make the data difficult to work with, as both “state shares” and Legal Person 
ownership are classified as “A-shares” in the Taiwan Economic Journal data used in this study.2 
There are two forms of tradeable shares - “A” and “B” shares. Tradeable A-shares, are 
typically simply called “A-shares,” despite the existence of non-tradable A-shares as mentioned 
above. “A-shares” are ordinary shares with voting rights of one-share-one-vote and the same 
dividend rights as other shares. They are traded domestically by primarily domestic individual 
investors on Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. Only Chinese citizens, a few domestic 
institutions and a handful of approved foreign institutions can hold them or trade them - the 
market has opened to large foreign institutions that are required to follow strict guidelines 
{Buckley, 2003 #4988}. “B-shares” are tradeable on the B-share market and denominated in 
foreign currency: U.S. dollars in Shanghai and Hong Kong dollars in Shenzhen. B-shares have 
traditionally been held principally by foreign investors and a small number of domestic securities 
firms with special permission to hold them. The B-share market has now been opened up for 
trading by domestic Chinese with funds from offshore accounts. As a rule, in the order of only 
                                                 
2
 This is all very confusing at first and takes some unravelling in building the datasets for the study. 
 8 
one third of the shares of the typical firm are tradeable and held by individual investors (see 
Figure 2). 
Employee shares are collectively held by employees of a firm and are usually issued at a 
discount before the firm goes public {Chen, 2000 #598}. At the time of listing, they are non-
tradable shares, although they can be converted into tradable A-shares 3 years after listing, with 
approval from the authorities. Typically, employee shares are not a performance incentive, but 
are compensation for past association with a firm. On average, they account for a small 
percentage of firm ownership (see Figure 2). 
Cross-listed holdings are held in a number of international exchanges such as Hong Kong, 
New York, Japan, London, Frankfurt and other European exchanges. Most common are “H” and 
“N” shares which are listed in Hong Kong or New York respectively. Cross-listing in Singapore 
(“S” shares) are also relatively common. Red Chips’ are stocks issued by Hong Kong firms that 
receive substantial backing from Chinese institutions. ‘China Plays’ are Taiwan and Hong Kong 
firms, listed on home exchanges, but that have substantial business interests in China. There are 
presently fourteen Chinese firms listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), however, 
interestingly, not all of these are listed on the domestic exchanges in China. Some firms are also 
listed on other foreign stock exchanges. For example, China Eastern Airlines Corporation Ltd is 
listed on the Berlin, Frankfurt, Hong Kong, Munich, New York, Stuttgart, XETRA Electronic 
Trading and Shanghai stock exchanges {Hovey, 2004 #8212}. 
Figure 1 below depicts the average holdings of listed firms in China for all the years 
1999-2005. As can  be observed State held an average of 41.28% of equity in listed firms in 
China during this period, whereas LP holdings were 19.43%. Thus overall the state had a 
significant influence, if not control, of an average of 60.71% holdings during this period - this 
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could readily be classified as a supermajority interest. Private ownership was made up of Public 
Shares at an average of 30.45% and Foreign Shares at just 3.17%. Therefore, even though these 
are partially privatised firms, the average private holdings were just 33.62% during this period. 
Figure 1: Average Holdings (%) 1997-2005 
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Data Source: TEJ (2006). 
Note: The balance = Other Founder, Preferred and Employee shares. 
 
Figure 2 shows the year-by-year break up of the average ownership structure of listed 
firms in China for each for the years 1999-2005. As can be observed, interestingly state holdings 
have increased overall from 40.2% to 42.3%. LP holdings were at their lowest at 18.8% in 2002 
and at their peak of 20.1% in 2003, but have declined back to 19.6% in 2005. Private holdings 
(Public) have actually decreased from 33.1% in 1999 to 27.9% in 2005, whilst, Foreign holdings 
have increased from 1.3% in 1999 to 5.3% in 2005. 
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Figure 2 Ownership Structure 1997-2004 Year-by-Year Averages (%)  
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Data Source: TEJ (2006). 
Note: The balance = Other Founder, Preferred and Employee shares. 
 
3. Data 
The study is based on a dataset compiled from the Taiwan Economic Journal (henceforth 
TEJ) Greater China Database of firms listed on both the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges 
from 1999 to 2005. Thus, the study is based on more recent data than earlier studies in China. 
Financial institutions are not included in this study. The market values, accounting and ownership 
data used in this research is obtained from various TEJ databases for China and is used in the 
valuation of all shares, consistent with prior studies. The industrial classifications were sourced 
separately.  
In all, the pooled dataset is made up of a total of 6,222 observations. The availability of 
financial data is used as a basis for the selection as to which firms are included in the dataset. 
Some data are missing for some firms, thus when the model is run these firms are dropped. The 
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results show the number of observations in each case. On average each run consisted of 1,673 
observations, given the lack of data for dividends. 
One of the problems faced in the study of enterprises of China is that the publicly 
available data is restricted to the relatively few listed firms. Furthermore, perhaps better-managed 
firms comply with disclosure requirements and submit timely reports and thus their data is 
available. Therefore, the sample may not be truly representative and thus it is acknowledged that 
the study suffers from a data selection bias. 
4. The Empirical Analysis 
In this analysis, the linkage between the leverage, ownership structure and firm 
profitability is investigated. If profitability is irrelevant, it would be expected to be insignificant 
in regressions on leverage. If ownership structure is irrelevant, the percentage of holdings of each 
category of ownership would be expected to be insignificant in regressions on leverage. 
Regression analysis is used to examine the relative importance of ownership mix and structure in 
predicting the financial performance of listed enterprises in China tested by estimating the 
following equation: 
εβββββ
βββββββα
++++++
+++++++=
iiiii
iiiiiii
INDDACCPRCHGRANTAGE
DIVTANGTAXGRTHSIZEROAEO
12111098
7654321i
_
  LEV
  (1) 
 
Where:  
LEV  =  The leverage of the firm taken as the total debt to equity ratio. 
EO = The equity ownership fraction of State Shares, Legal Person Shares, Public 
Shares and Foreign Shares.  
ROA  =  The return on assets applying the EBIT/total assets model. 
SIZE = Size is taken as the natural log of the market value.  
GRTH  =  Growth potential taken as the market to book value ratio.  
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TAX = The tax shield – the proxy used in this study is the tax deduction for 
depreciation over total assets. 
Tang  =  Tangibility - the proxy used in this study is tangible assets over total assets. 
DIV  =  Dividend - the proxy used in this study is dividend and bonus payments over 
gross profits. 
AGE  = Total age of the firm taken as number of years the firm has been in operation. 
GRANT = Government Grants scaled by total assets. 
CH_PR = A dummy variable taken as 1 if the Chairman and President are the same 
person and 0 if they are not. 
AUDT = A dummy variable taken as 1 if the auditing firm used is a “Big Six” 
international accounting firm. 
INDD = Twenty-one industry control variables.  
        α  =  the intercept, β = the regression coefficients; and ε = the error term.  
 
Employing the data for all listed companies 1999-2005 with available data, a series of 
linear regressions are run as well as an unbalanced panel data set. The detail of these variables is 
provided below.  
4.1 Leverage 
In the regressions, the dependent variable is financial leverage (LEV), which is the debt to 
equity ratio of each firm as measured by the book value of total debt divided by the equity. 
Consistent with the risk associated with higher levels of debt and with pecking order theory, debt 
is typically negatively correlated to the profitability of the firm. However, the “policy lending” 
regime during this period in China {Park, 2001 #2205} may give rise to higher levels of debt 
having quite a differently effect. In China, higher leverage may imply the availability of state 
funding for corporate operations {Chow, 1998 #960}.  
After listing, obviously SOEs have access to private equity. Thus their leverage would be 
expected to decrease compared to prior to listing. As SOEs did not have access to private equity 
prior to listing, the only source of funds apart from government grants, were borrowings from the 
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state owned banks. Thus SOEs had a high level of leverage. Furthermore, the cost of debt was 
low as they borrowed from state owned banks and had either implicit or explicit government 
guarantees. Adding to this, often SOEs did not expect to repay the loans leading to a high 
proportion of non-performing loans for the state owned banks {Hovey, 2001 #589}. Typically, 
SOEs had low or negative profitability {Cull, 2005 #592; Aivazian, 2005 #591}, thus retained 
earnings were not generally available.  
However, in China debt levels would be expected to remain high even after listing 
because of the quota system for listing which continued until February 2000. The quota system 
limited the amount of capital allowed to be raised, as well as limiting the number of firms that 
could list publicly. The government placed a quota on the of capital raised by IPOs nationally 
each year, which was administered by provincial governments which typically allocate the quota 
to firms based on various criteria, some listed poorly performing firms, preventing individual 
SOEs from raising as much equity capital as needed {Neoh, 1999 #621}. 
Even though the quota system has been removed, still firms cannot raise all the capital 
they require at IPO and often have to rely on other sources of funds. They also typically raise 
further funds through rights issues after IPO {Chen, 2004 #593; Wang, 2006 #594}. All in all, 
debt, especially Bank loans, is still a significant and necessary source of capital.  
The pressure on capital allocations is also increased as often unprofitable SOEs have been 
encouraged to merge with, or be acquired by, profitable SOEs {Cooper, 1998 #595; Dirkis, 1998 
#596}. During a restructure, better performing SOEs may be merged with poorly performing 
SOEs to save that SOE, to the detriment of the better performing SOE.  
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4.2 Equity Ownership 
Equity ownership (EO) is the average percentage holdings by the various categories of 
ownership. Specifically, it is the equity ownership fraction of State Shares, Legal Person Shares, 
Public Shares and Foreign Shares. As state ownership and LP ownership are highly correlated, at 
-84.98%, the regressions are run separately for them. State ownership has been found to be 
negatively correlated to performance in the literature {Hovey, 2007 #590} {see for example, \Gul, 
2001 #8245; Hovey, 2003 #2484; Xu, 1999 #515; Chen, 2000 #598; Wei, 2003 #6002} , 
however the influence of state holdings on leverage is unknown. It is expected to be negative as 
the higher the state ownership, the less availability to equity capital and the higher level of 
implied guarantee. Prior research on Legal Person holdings suggests that LP ownership is 
positively correlated with performance {Hovey, 2007 #590} {see for example, \Gul, 2001 #8245; 
Hovey, 2003 #2484; Xu, 1999 #515; Chen, 2000 #598}, however the influence of state holdings 
on leverage is unknown. Public Shares is equity ownership of publicly held tradable A-shares. 
The higher the level of publicly held equity the less the requirement for debt, thus it is expected 
to reduce the reliance on debt. However, the supermajority ownership of the state and low levels 
of individual holdings may reduce any effect. Foreign Shares is the total of foreign individual and 
institution holdings. Chhibber and Majumdar {, 1999 #973} found that foreign ownership at 
concentrations of 51 percent or higher has a positive influence on performance in India. However, 
the effect on debt is unknown, but again is expected to reduce the reliance on debt.  
In China, the percentage of shares held by employees, managers, directors and 
supervisory board members is relatively insignificant. Accordingly, it is considered that their 
overall influence is inconsequential. Hence, they are not included in the analysis. Support for this 
comes from Gul and Zhao {, 2001 #8245} who found that the percentage of shares held by 
 15 
directors and supervisory board members are not significant in regressions of firm performance in 
China.  
4.3 Profitability 
In the regressions, the profitability instrument that is applied is return on assets (ROA), 
which is an independent variable. The return on assets is applied is the EBIT over total assets 
model, rather than the typical net income over over total assets. As EBIT represents operating 
profit, EBIT over total assets should give a better estimate of performance regardless of the 
leverage or any favored tax treatment. 
A number of empirical studies have been conducted studying the relationship between 
leverage and profitability. For example, leverage is found to be negatively correlated with 
profitability in both the US and Japan {Kester, 1991 #597}, in developed economies {see for 
example \Rajan, 1995 #588; Bevan, 2004 #115}, and in developing economies {see for example 
\Booth, 2001 #258; Fraser, 2006 #16}. Studies so far in China find a negative correlation 
between leverage and profitability {Huang, 2006 #1; Tong, 2005 #2; Zhang, 2002 #4}. Never the 
less, in China, it is possible that the higher the proportion of state holdings to debt, being an 
indication of state capital assistance via policy lending, which is an indicator of state benevolence 
and support, and a reduced cost of debt and the opportunity for higher firm performance {Chen, 
2000 #598}. Despite this possibility, it is expected that a negative correlation between leverage 
and profitability will be found. 
4.4 Size  
The next independent variable applied is firm SIZE which controls for the size effect. 
Fama and French {, 1995 #3051}, found that size is a factor in the returns of a firm. In the case of 
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China, bigger SOEs have potentially greater government control and evoke more bureaucracy 
and agency problems, and increased redundancy.  
By and large, empirical studies in developed economies have found leverage to be 
positively related to company size {see for example \Booth, 2001 #258; Rajan, 1995 #588; Wald, 
1999 #325; Wald, 1999 #326}. In a study of firms in China, Huang and Song {Huang, 2006 #1} 
found that leverage increases with size.  
While there are many different proxies for size, in this study, the natural logarithm of 
market value of the firm is used. 
4.5 Growth 
Growth represents the growth opportunities of a firm. Generally, empirical studies in 
developed economies have found leverage to be positively related to company growth 
opportunities {see for example \Booth, 2001 #258; Rajan, 1995 #588; Wald, 1999 #325; Wald, 
1999 #326; Smith, 1992 #599}. 
While there are many different proxies for growth opportunities, this study follows Booth 
et al. (2001) and others and use the market-to-book ratio of equity to proxy for future growth 
opportunities.  
4.6 Tax Shield 
Tax, or more precisely tax shields, represents the non-debt tax shields for the firm. The 
proxy used in this study is the tax deduction for depreciation over total assets. It is suggested that 
tax shields are a proxy for the tax benefits that debt financing provides {DeAngelo, 1980 #600}. 
Thus, a firm with a greater proportion of tax shields is predicted to employ less debt. The ratio of 
depreciation to total assets is applied by Wald (1999), and this study follows this and uses 
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depreciation over total assets to represent tax shields, and following previous studies, expect to 
find that leverage is negatively correlated with tax shields. 
4.7 Tangible assets 
The variable Tangible Assets represents the tangibility of the firm and tests the 
relationship between tangibility and leverage. The proxy used in this study is tangible assets over 
total assets. It is suggested in the literature that tangibility should be correlated positively to 
capital structure {Jensen, 1976 #616}. Generally, empirical studies in developed economies have 
found leverage to be positively related to tangibility {see for example \Rajan, 1995 #588; Wald, 
1999 #325; Wald, 1999 #326}. It is unknown as to how this relationship will be played out in 
China, however tangibility is expected to have a similar relationship.  
4.8 Dividend  
The variable Dividend represents the dividend and bonus payments of the firm and tests 
the relationship between leverage and dividends and bonuses. Following Fama and French {, 
2002 #615}, the proxy used in this study is dividend and bonus payments data, as provided by 
TEJ, over total assets.  
The literature suggests that firms with higher investments have long-term dividend 
payouts that are lower {Fama, 2002 #615}. According to the agency theory, dividends and debt 
may control perquisite consumption by management arising from free cash flow. How this 
impacts on the situation in China is not clear, however higher dividends payments are expected to 
be correlated negatively with leverage. 
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4.9 Age  
Age represents the total age of firm taken as number of years the firm has been in 
operation. The variable follows Zou and Xiao {, 2006 #617} who suggest that the age of the firm 
may influence its leverage in China. 
4.10 Government Grants 
The variable grant is Government Grants scaled by total assets and is included to test the 
significance of Government Grants and thus direct state support on the leverage of listed firms in 
China. The sign is expected to be negative as the more state support is provided the less the 
reliance on debt capital.  
4.11 Chairman and President  
The variable Chairman and President is a dummy variable taken as 1 if the Chairman and 
President are the same person and 0 if they are not. In the corporate governance literature if the 
chairman and president’s positions are not separated, it is an indication of relatively poorer 
corporate governance and thus impact on the performance of a firm {Palmon, 2002 #618}. In this 
study it is included to determine if there is any relationship with the leverage of a firm in China. 
4.12 Auditing Firm  
Consistent with agency theory and the monitoring of firms, prior studies have found a 
relationship between high quality auditing firms, leverage and audit committee activity {Collier, 
1999 #1392}. In this study it is a dummy variable taken as 1 if the accounting firm used is a high 
quality “Big Six” international auditing firm.  
4.13 Industry  
The industry variable is included to control for the industry in which the firm is involved. 
Lindenberg and Ross {, 1981 #620}, suggest that the industrial organization has a significant 
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bearing upon the performance of firms because they are affected by similar economic and 
business conditions and risks. In all, there are 21 similar industries observed (see the list provided 
under Descriptive Statistics, Table 2). 
5. Descriptive Statistics 
The descriptive statistics are shown in Table 1 below. As observed, there is a wide 
variation in leverage, the maximum being 200,261.50 and a minimum of -8,754.55. Of the 
independent variables, State Shares averaged 41.28%, Legal Person Shares averaged 19.43, 
Public Shares averaged 30.45, and Foreign Shares 3.17%.  
Tax Shield and Government Grants over Assets had the lowest standard deviation 
whereas Leverage was exceptionally high and Dividends and Bonus Payment over Assets was 
also high.  
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
  Mean  Median  Maximum  Minimum  Std. Dev. 
 Obser- 
vations 
Leverage 136.83 48.64 200,261.50 -8,754.55 3,027.85 6204 
State Shares (%) 41.28 45.38 100.00 0.00 25.94 6220 
Legal Person Shares (%) 19.43 10.76 100.00 0.00 22.71 6220 
Public Shares (%) 30.45 30.32 100.00 0.00 15.42 6220 
Foreign Shares (%) 3.17 0.00 99.00 0.00 9.55 6220 
ROA-EBIT 2.12 3.19 51.17 -215.96 10.85 6204 
Growth (MBV) 0.65 0.31 40.93 0.03 1.05 6204 
Size 13.05 12.83 18.43 10.84 1.12 6220 
Div Bonus Payment -1.66 0.00 3,333.62 -1,617.56 99.47 1678 
Tax Shield 0.03 0.02 1.26 -0.04 0.03 5224 
Tangibility  0.97 0.99 1.04 0.20 0.06 6204 
Gov Grants 0.00 0.00 0.42 0.00 0.01 6204 
Total Age of Firm 22.58 13.94 104.13 5.08 18.23 6220 
Industry 4.80 6.00 9.00 1.00 2.13 6220 
Chair&Pres-Same 0.09 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.28 6220 
AUDT Big6 0.08 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.27 6220 
 
Table 2 below lists the industry classifications as applied in this study in alphabetical 
order and provides the descriptive statistics and the industry code used. The larges number of 
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firms is in Chemicals, with the least number in Telecom. Others is the largest sector with a 
market value of Rmb 7,728,114 million and Utilities is next with Rmb 4,526,094 million. Others 
also has the highest average market value at Rmb 4,526,094 million and Wire & Cable is next 
with Rmb 156,072 million. 
Table 2: Industry Statistics as at 31 December 2003 
Industry Classification Industry 
Code used in 
this Study 
Number of 
Firms in 
Industry 
MV of 
Industry 
(Rmb Mill.) 
Average MV  
(Rmb Mill.) 
Automobile 1 26 116,795 7,582 
Cement 3 15 113,728 4,492 
Chemicals 4 102 1,331,130 11,687 
Conglomerate 5 12 140,243 41,232 
Construction 6 62 1,424,923 28,267 
Electrical Appliances 7 82 1,881,221 91,316 
Electronic Technology 8 98 2,858,327 46,201 
Foods 9 79 2,236,197 38,737 
Glass/Ceramics 10 11 453,548 13,050 
Plastics 11 28 1,084,637 87,709 
Pulp/Paper 12 20 565,333 22,983 
Retailing 13 62 1,999,784 22,942 
Steel 14 34 2,275,818 32,255 
Telecom 15 10 913,160 28,306 
Textile 16 80 3,885,285 66,936 
Tourism 17 20 924,014 29,167 
Transportation 18 40 4,224,656 48,566 
Utilities 19 29 4,526,094 105,616 
Wire & Cable 20 16 1,403,346 156,072 
Others 21 39 7,728,114 198,157 
Data Source: Collated from Industrial classifications listed in the media and provided by TEJ (2003). 
6. Results of the Study 
Various tests are run to check for normal distribution, heteroscedasticity, correlation and 
multicollinearity. The variables are relatively normally distributed and a Pearson Correlation test 
indicates that state and LP ownership are highly correlated at -84.98%, otherwise no variables are 
significantly correlated in the regressions as run. As state ownership and LP ownership are highly 
correlated, the regressions are run separately for these variables. Collinearity tests show no 
significant multicollinearity. 
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The results of the regressions against leverage as previously described are presented in 
Table 3 and Table 4 below which reports the variable coefficients and the statistics for each 
regression, as well as the adjusted R2. 
Table 3: Results Including Legal Person Shares  
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 251.63 97.30 2.59 0.98% 
Legal Person Shares (%) 0.16 0.17 0.95 34.32% 
Public Shares (%) 0.14 0.27 0.50 61.90% 
Foreign Shares (%) 1.85 0.65 2.85 0.44% 
ROA-EBIT -3.43 0.44 -7.72 0.00% 
Growth (MBV) -145.77 28.93 -5.04 0.00% 
Size -11.45 5.58 -2.05 4.03% 
Div Bonus Payment 0.01 0.04 0.19 84.80% 
Tax Shield -322.39 199.62 -1.62 10.65% 
Tangibility  -2.62 68.71 -0.04 96.96% 
Gov Grants/Assets -309.88 738.31 -0.42 67.48% 
Total Age of Firm 0.49 0.19 2.55 1.09% 
Industry 4.37 1.68 2.59 0.97% 
Chair&Pres-Same -12.50 12.79 -0.98 32.85% 
Audt Big6 -12.49 14.21 -0.88 37.97% 
Adjusted R-squared 5.84%  n 1673 
Table 4: Results Including State Shares  
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 271.03 94.35 2.87 0.41% 
State Shares (%) -0.09 0.16 -0.58 56.52% 
Public Shares (%) 0.07 0.29 0.24 81.28% 
Foreign Shares (%) 1.77 0.67 2.65 0.81% 
ROA-EBIT -3.42 0.44 -7.70 0.00% 
Growth (MBV) -143.17 28.73 -4.98 0.00% 
Size -12.21 5.49 -2.22 2.62% 
Div Bonus Payment 0.01 0.04 0.17 86.64% 
Tax Shield -328.75 199.72 -1.65 9.99% 
Tangibility  -3.67 68.82 -0.05 95.74% 
Gov Grants/Assets -322.97 738.84 -0.44 66.21% 
Total Age of Firm 0.47 0.19 2.47 1.35% 
Industry 4.37 1.69 2.59 0.96% 
Chair&Pres-Same -12.28 12.79 -0.96 33.71% 
Audt Big6 -12.80 14.31 -0.89 37.13% 
Adjusted R-squared 5.80%  n 1673 
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As indicated by the results of the regressions using unbalanced panel data, the evidence 
holds that the profitability does have explanatory power as profitability is strongly negatively 
correlated with leverage.  
As to ownership, the variable that is showing significance is Foreign Shares, which is 
positive and highly significant in both runs, showing that leverage is found to decrease with 
Foreign ownership. Public ownership is positive also, whereas state is negatively related, but 
these are not significant. 
The additional matters that are identified in the empirical analysis are that growth is 
relevant and highly significant, as high growth firms are found not to carry as much debt. Size is 
relevant and significant also, in that leverage increases with size in these firms listed in China. 
The tax shield is shown to be negative and significant at the ten percent level. The total age of 
firm is relevant and significant also, showing that leverage decreases with older firms. The 
industry is also found to be relevant and significant.  
7. Conclusion 
China has experienced outstanding growth as the reforms which began in the late 1970s 
gain momentum. As China moves towards a “socialist market economy” the reforms have been 
an important aspect of the outstanding economic growth that has been accomplished. In the 
corporate world the majority of small and medium and many large former SOEs have been 
privatised or partially privatised. The focus of this paper is on the interesting ownership mix of 
the listed firms, and the relationship between leverage, performance and a firm’s ownership 
structure. It is an exploratory study based on listed firms in China. The results of an empirical 
analysis of all firms listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 1999 to 2005 are 
reported in this paper.  
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The most significant result is that foreign holdings are found to have a significant 
relationship with the leverage of listed firms in China. Whereas, somewhat unexpectedly, 
institutional ownership, through Legal Person holding companies, state ownership and private 
holdings are not found to have a significant relationship with the capital structure choices of firms 
in China. The results also suggest that some firm-specific factors that are relevant for explaining 
firm leverage generally referred to in studies in developed economies, such as profitability, 
growth opportunities, size and tax shields, are also relevant in China. The age of the firms and the 
industry to which they principally belong also has significant bearing. Yet direct government 
grants and the use of an internationally renowned auditing firm do not show a significant 
relationship. Generally, it is shown that better explanatory power is provided with the more 
recent data used in this study, suggesting that the Chinese markets may be maturing. 
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